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firms. The availability of many alternative
providers allows successful program innovations
to be copied by other states. Finally, with mobile
residents, government repression of individual
political and civil rights becomes more difficult.
For each of these reasons, state governments can
play a central role in ensuring a prosperous and
democratic society.1
States today, however, are under significant
fiscal stress. The recent deep economic recession
has both reduced state revenues and increased state
expenditures, particularly for Medicaid outlays
for state poverty populations. The end result has
been large state deficits requiring employee layoffs
S
tates and their subsidiaries, local govern-
ments, have long been the foundation of
public finance in the United States, a fact
no less true today than at the country’s
founding. Today state and local governments
account for over 70 percent of the nation’s spend-
ing on nondefense public goods and services. As
a matter of public policy, we have chosen to decen-
tralize the provision of governmental services—
and for good reasons. State and local governments
offer significant choices to our mobile residents
and businesses for the provision and levels of
services. Choices encourage states to compete for
residents and firms, which leads to improved fiscal
performance and a better matching of service pro-
vision to the wants and needs of residents and
The 2007-10 recession has imposed significant fiscal hardships on state and local governments.
The result has been state budget deficits and the need to increase state taxes, cut spending, and
withdraw funds from state “rainy day” accounts. The primary cause of state budget “gaps” has
been the rise in the level of state unemployment. There is no evidence that these gaps are related
to state political institutions, a state’s prior receipt of federal funding, or possibly favored access
to key congressional budget committees. The federal government has responded to these gaps with
the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 to aid states in fiscal
distress and provide economic stimulus. Though intended as insurance for fiscal distress, ARRA
covers at most $0.23 of each dollar of a state’s recession-induced budget gap. These funds are pro-
vided through a large per capita payment to each state, independent of any level of state deficit.
AARA was also intended as targeted assistance for stimulating local economies, but its funding
is uncorrelated with state unemployment rates. ARRA funding appears to be decided by congres-
sional politics, given Congress’s desire to pass a major spending and tax relief package as quickly
as possible. States are important “agents” for federal macroeconomic policy, but agents with their
own needs and objectives. (JEL H3, H6, H7) 
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and furloughs, program cuts, and tax increases to
restore balanced budgets. State program cuts have
been concentrated in the two biggest spending
categories: (i) state aid to local education and (ii)
transfers and services for lower-income families.
In February 2009, 44 states reported that their antici-
pated balanced budgets for fiscal year (FY) 2009
had turned to deficits. Only states with significant
severance taxes on state natural resources—
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wyoming—showed zero expected
deficits for the remainder of their fiscal year. These
trends have continued into FY 2010. Revenues are
still expected to fall below state expenditures, and
only through a variety of budget gimmicks, such as
asset sales, pension underfundings, and dipping
into “off-budget” funds, will the troubled states be
able to balance their budgets.2
It is no surprise then that states as a group
turned to Congress for relief. Congress responded
with the passage of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009. As
part of that legislation, the federal government pro-
vided over $223 billion for three years of fiscal relief
for state and local governments, divided about
equally between (i) general fiscal relief for educa-
tion, Medicaid, and welfare expenditures and (ii)
program- and project-specific transfers meant to
stimulate the economy. 
This paper provides a preliminary evaluation
of the ARRA’s relief for states in fiscal distress. It
does so against a backdrop of how state finances
work best in “normal” times. I reach two conclu-
sions. First, although ARRA did provide significant
aggregate fiscal relief to all state governments, the
allocation of the program’s funds provided at best
weak relief for those states in greatest fiscal distress.
Only $0.23 of each ARRA dollar was explicitly
targeted to closing state mid-year deficit gaps. The
remaining $0.77 of each ARRA dollar increased
funding of state services generally or aided new
programs favored by Congress and the Obama
administration. Congressional politics played a
significant role in allocating these new program-
matic dollars. Second, the analysis of state budget-
ing in normal times suggests a better way to manage
state finances in times of fiscal distress—that is,
to encourage each state to maintain a budget-
stabilization, or “rainy day,” fund equal to at least
10 percent of state expenditures. The best way to
encourage such behavior is for Congress to commit
to no federal bailouts of states in fiscal distress.
Congress first did so in response to the state fiscal
crises of the 1840s and has continued this tradition
down to President Gerald Ford’s emphatic “No”
to the bailout requests of New York City and New
York State during their fiscal crises of 1974.3 Today’s
crises in state finances provide another opportunity
to reconfirm this commitment. 
EFFICIENT STATE BUDGETING IN
NORMAL TIMES
State governments perform two essential func-
tions in our public economy. First, they provide
statewide public services not efficiently provided
by the many local governments. These are services
that display significant economies of scale in pro-
duction or that correct for between-community
economic externalities—services such as higher
education; construction, maintenance, and safety
of public highways; prisons and courts; and the
protection of water and air quality. Second, states
redistribute incomes between residents and provide
for a minimally acceptable level of meritorious local
services. These redistributive activities include
income protection, training, and job placement;
the provision of health care services for children
and lower-income families; and the guarantee,
through intergovernmental transfers to schools,
of a minimally acceptable level of K-12 public
education for all children. 
To ensure that state residents pay the marginal
costs of state services, state taxes should be resident-
or destination-based taxation. Resident-based tax-
ation taxes factors of production based on where
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2 For an excellent description of the current condition of state finances
and budget strategies for dealing with states’ fiscal crises, see the
National Governors Association (NGA) and the National Association
of State Budget Officers (NASBO) (June 2009, particularly Tables A-2,
A-3, A-5a, and A-5b and their notes, which provide the details of
how states have chosen to close their fiscal gaps).
3 See Inman (2003) and Wallis and Kim (2005) for a review of this
history and Shefter (1992) for a valuable review of the finance and
politics of the New York fiscal crises.the factors “live,” not where they work, and taxes
consumption based on the location of the consumer.
The alternative is source-, or origin-, based taxation,
which taxes factors of production by where they
work and taxes consumption at the point of pur-
chase. Source-based taxation may allow a share of
the tax burden to shift onto nonresident labor and
owners of productive capital and nonresident con-
sumers of goods and services produced within the
state. Source-based taxation, however, has two
adverse consequences for economic efficiency.
First, it discourages the efficient location of eco-
nomic inputs.4 Second, because nonresidents pay
a share of the taxes used to finance the marginal
costs of state services, residents or their elected
officials may find it advantageous to overprovide
subsidized state services.5 For economic efficiency,
then, the preferred structure of state taxation is
resident based—ideally resident income, property,
and consumption taxation. 
With efficient state finances in “normal” times,
states should be allowed to use long-term debt to
manage large and unexpected expenditures that
arise during the fiscal year. Without the ability to
borrow to cover such expenditures, states would
be forced to raise tax rates significantly. Firms and
households typically react to large increases in their
tax rates by making a disproportionately large
reduction in valued private sector activities, such
as investment, savings, or work effort. These effi-
ciency losses, known as the excess burden of taxa-
tion, grow exponentially with the state tax rate. The
use of government debt to pay for large one-time
expenditures allows the government to increase
tax rates only slightly and to then hold tax rates
stable over the period of debt repayment. This fiscal
strategy is called “tax smoothing” and helps to
minimize the efficiency losses of state taxation.6
Large increases in state expenditures may occur for
two reasons: capital outlays for public infrastruc-
ture or relief spending to offset losses from natural
disasters or deep recessions. Debt financing for
either reason is an important component of efficient
state financing.
The aim of efficient state government finances
is to have each state set its level of public services
or transfers so that the marginal benefits of the
public dollar just spent equal the marginal costs
of financing that dollar. Unfortunately, states may
not always choose an efficient level of public ser  -
vices or transfers, adopt efficient tax instruments,
or use long-term debt appropriately. In these cases,
federal government intervention may be necessary,
including the following measures. 
First, state spending must allow for all inter-
state spillovers, which could be relieved by federal
financial assistance. Service spillovers are likely
to be most pronounced for states that redistribute
resident incomes or provide public goods that
directly benefit nonresidents. States that engage
in higher-than-average income redistribution attract
lower-income residents from other states and drive
out upper-income residents from their own. Such
mobility of residents discourages states from pro-
viding what may otherwise be desired income
transfers. This fiscal externality could be solved
by federal intergovernmental transfers to states in
proportion to the redistributive benefits created
for residents outside the state or for the added
costs borne because of the exit of the mobile tax
base from within the state.7 Federally funded
intergovernmental transfers are appropriate, too,
for state-provided public goods (e.g., major inter-
state highways, intercity airports, and infrastruc-
ture that protects air and water quality) that
significantly benefit residents outside the state.
The preferred form of such transfers is a price sub-
sidy or “matching” grant equal to the share of all
benefits enjoyed by nonresidents of the state.8
Second, federal policies could help states
achieve more-efficient taxation. Although resident
taxation is an efficient way to tax for state services,
source-based taxation may be preferred by state
residents or their elected officials. Source-based
taxation is significantly easier to administer. Taxes
on labor income can be collected by a withholding
tax administered by firms located within the state.
Inman
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because long-term debt used to pay for current
services creates a subsidy of those services if that
debt is finally repaid by future residents.
There is a marketplace solution to these deficit-
induced inefficiencies, however. If future debt
obligations are known to all future residents and
firms and if those residents and firms have equally
attractive locations in other states—that is, com-
petitive locations are in elastic supply—then any
taxes to repay long-term debt used to finance prior
services must be “rebated” to all new residents and
firms before they will locate in the high-deficit
state.10 This can be done for new residents by either
raising resident wages or by lowering the price of
land for housing. New firms will enter the state
only if wages are lower or if land for production is
priced lower. But in the end, the price of land will
bear the full burden of paying for past deficits. Land
and its valued attributes—mines, oil and gas, fertile
farmland, beaches, sunshine, mountains, ports, or
long-standing agglomeration economies—are the
only factors unique to the state and the ones that
cannot move to escape the tax.11 In the end, the
debt-induced tax for current services is shifted
back onto the owners of location-specific assets in
the form of lower rents and entrepreneurial profits.
And this is as it should be, for it was these owners
of the fixed assets who enjoyed the benefits of the
deficit-financed services when they were first pro-
vided. With efficient private markets, therefore,
those who first received benefits now pay for the
benefits, just as efficient public finance requires. 
The problem with the market solution to state
deficit financing lies in discovering and credibly
signaling the level of such debt-financed current-
account fiscal deficits. State officials have at least
four ways to conceal a deficit: (i) At the end of each
fiscal year, state officials may reveal the deficit but
then pass the shortfall to next year’s budget with a
Capital income taxes, once income is apportioned
across multiple locations, can also be collected
directly from the firms within the state. Finally,
sales taxes can be collected at the point of sale
rather than requiring residents to keep records of
out-of-state purchases. In addition to ease of admin-
istration, all revenues from source-based taxation
collected from nonresidents act as a subsidy to
residents for their purchase of state public services.
It is not surprising, then, that state officials adopt
source-based rather than resident-based taxation.
Fortunately, certain federal policies can solve this
problem while still leaving state governments full
control over their choice of tax rates. State-resident
income and sales taxation could be “piggybacked”
onto the federal income tax or a federal sales, value-
added, or consumption tax. The state would select
a tax rate and the federal government would col-
lect the revenues from a shared national tax base,
say, resident income or consumption, as reported
by residents of the state. Because of the high mobil-
ity of capital and the difficulty of apportioning
fixed costs across locations, capital taxation should
be administered and the rates set solely by the
central government.9
Third, the federal government may be needed
to monitor states’ use of long-term debt. The prob-
lem arises when states use long-term debt to finance
current-year government services. Unless current
and future residents, or future factors of production
if taxation is source based, fully understand the
extent of such deficit financing for current services,
market and public sector inefficiencies will result.
Market inefficiencies occur because future taxes
must be increased, even though there is no future
public asset (in the case of infrastructure) or income
insurance program (in the case of disasters) whose
benefits compensate for the tax increase. This dis-
courages the location of new private capital and/or
labor in the state, even if these factors’ pretax mar-
ginal productivity would be higher than in their
next-best location. Public sector inefficiencies occur
9 See Wildasin (1989), who suggests that perhaps some of the proceeds
of a national capital tax could be allocated back to states through
intergovernmental transfers for support of productive public infra-
structure complementary to private capital There is an extensive
literature on the design of such tax and transfer schemes; see Krelove
(1992) for the theory and Rivlin (1992, Chap. 8) for an application
to U.S. federalism. 
10 An assumption of perfect elasticity of new capital to each state is
certainly reasonable for capital. For evidence that residents and
productive labor are also elastically supplied to states in the long
run, see Blanchard and Katz (1992). 
11 See Mieszkowski (1972) and more recently Rangel (2005). In the
“not too” long run there may also be fixed capital assets in place
within the state, the most important of which is the existing housing
stock. This fixed capital stock will also be depreciated by its share
of the costs of long-term debt unmatched by compensating public
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must be borne by each individual buyer and may
simply exceed the expected benefits of participat-
ing in the market. A “lemons” market may occur,
where high-debt states discourage the efficient
relocation of economic activity generally.14
Paradoxically perhaps, the only parties with
an economic interest in providing credible market
information are the current owners of assets in the
state adopting the deficit strategy. Doing so pro-
vides a more-liquid market for their private assets
and likely higher asset prices when they choose to
sell. Importantly, since providing the information
is a public good to all buyers, there are significant
economies of scale from having the information
provided by a single agent—perhaps a supervising
agency of the state itself closely monitored by the
state’s current asset owners. Further, since invest-
ing in a state often requires a long-term commit-
ment, having the oversight agency signal a credible
commitment to future deficit-free financing is also
needed. Let’s call these asset owners “current home-
owners,” the agency an “elected state supreme
court,” and the commitment mechanism a “con-
stitutionally based balanced-budget rule” (BBR).
Bohn and Inman (1996) find that constitutionally
based BBRs enforced by an independently elected
state supreme court do in fact provide a significant
check on elected state officials’ propensity to run
current-account fiscal deficits. But lacking such a
watchdog institution, states may abuse long-term
debt financing.15
There is one more requirement for market
discipline of state deficits to work—the federal
government must not bail out a state when its
accumulated deficits threaten state default. If the
national government cannot politically resist the
temptation to bail out troubled state governments
because of their macroeconomic or political impor-
promise to repay in coming years. If the accumu-
lated debts grows faster than state tax bases,
eventually the rollover strategy will collapse and
someone will need to cover the aggregated short-
falls.12 (ii) Officials may fail to maintain local capi-
tal stocks and not record depreciation of those
assets as a current expense. Unlike most machines,
such government assets decay gradually, continue
to provide services, but then may one day collapse.
The fall of the Mississippi River bridge connecting
the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, killing
13 persons and injuring another 145, is a tragic, but
not uncommon, example. (iii) States may borrow
money for new investments, but then spend those
funds on a current service, relabeled perhaps as a
“capital outlay.” (iv) States may underfund their
workers’ defined-benefit pension plans. To ensure
sufficient funds to pay workers’ promised annu-
ities, state governments must make a contribution
that, with accumulated interest, will pay the accu-
mulated annuity from that year’s salary. If the gov-
ernment contributes less than the required payment,
then the pension will be underfunded. Such under-
fundings are effectively a deficit created to pay part
of the compensation of current public employees.13
Information about the level of local debt created by
each borrowing strategy is the key to disciplining
inefficient deficits.
But who will provide the information about
these types of state deficits? It is unlikely that
elected state officials seeking reelection will reveal
the true level of state deficits since the deficit strat-
egy gives the appearance of quality services at low
tax rates. Future residents and firms might invest
in collecting the needed information, but unless
all potential buyers of state assets have this infor-
mation it will be the uninformed buyer who offers
the undiscounted price who buys the property.
Informed buyers do avoid a potentially bad invest-
ment, but the cost of acquiring deficit information
12 This rollover strategy was the central cause of the fiscal crises in
New York City in 1972, Philadelphia in 1990, the German states of
Saarland and Bremen in 1994, São Paulo in 1996, Buenos Aires in
1996, and Washington, D.C., in 1997. These fiscal histories are
described in Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003). Greece today is
a victim of such fiscal misbehaviors. 
13 See Inman (1982), who presents evidence that underfunded public
pensions lead to higher worker wages and more public employees
than would be observed if worker pensions were fully funded. 
14 Without credible information about deficits, when bidding for prop-
erty, uninformed buyers will always outbid informed buyers.
Although informed buyers could share information, uninformed
buyers are unlikely to believe it—they will fear that informed buyers
will announce too high a deficit estimate in hopes of prompting unin-
formed buyers to make offers that are too low. Thus, informed buyers
cannot win: Information is costly but does them no good. Information
here is a public good and should be provided by the government. 
15 Inman (1997) provides the formal political economy analysis of self-
enforcing BBRs. At the moment, 10 of the 50 states have the institu-
tional structure sufficient for a fully effective BBR. See Bohn and
Inman (1996, Table 2) and Hou and Smith (2006). tance—that is, that they are too big to fail—then
political improvidence trumps market discipline.
Knowing a bailout is available from the national
government, states will shift the cost of state services
onto national taxpayers in a beggar-thy-neighbor
game of deficit financing for current spending.16
To qualify as too big to fail, a state financial default
can either impose a large economic cost on the
national economy (for example, a financial col-
lapse, such as São Paulo’s financial default that
threatened Brazil in 1996, or the Greek, Portuguese,
or Spanish government debt that threatens the
“federal” European Union today), impose a large
loss on a particularly socially favored cohort (as
New Orleans’s default did following Hurricane
Katrina), or threaten a valued social resource not
easily duplicated (as was the case for Washington,
D.C., with its financial default in 1997). Having a
federal government with the discipline to say “No”
to a demand for a federal bailout is crucial for effi-
cient state government finances. 
Against the backdrop of these guidelines for
efficient state budgeting, then, how do U.S. states
do in normal times? For the sector as a whole, aggre-
gate fiscal performance seems fine. States spend
money on what they should, with federal inter-
governmental assistance where appropriate. State
taxes are largely residential. And most states have
balanced budgets with small annual contributions
to a budget stabilization fund for unforeseen
shocks to the state economy. 
For example, in FY 2006, the last pre-recession
year, state spending for current services and trans-
fers was $4,430/person: $1,725/person for state
services, such as highway maintenance, courts and
prisons, and protection of natural resources, and
$2,705/person for general transfers, such as welfare
and Medicaid and school aid. State spending for
new infrastructure was about $340/person. States
paid for these services and transfers largely with
residential taxes: 25 percent from residential
income taxes, 24 percent from general sales taxa-
tion, and 32 percent from resident user fees and
“sin taxes.” Together these residential taxes and
user fees totaled 7.2 percent of personal income.
The remaining share of state revenues were col-
lected from businesses through business fees and
a state corporate income tax. The state corporate
income tax is the only significant source-based tax
and contributed only 5 percent to aggregate state
revenues in 2006. All capital spending by states is
paid for through the issuance of long-term debt.17
Each year states have a significant gap between
revenues from fees and taxes and current spend-
ing. Again, on average for FY 2006, state revenues
covered $3,236/person of the $4,430/person in
current spending. The resulting gap of $1,194/per-
son was more than covered by $1,290/person in
federal intergovernmental transfers. Those transfers
(provided as grants) paid for income transfers,
Medicaid, and related services for state residents
in poverty ($750/person), for interstate highway
construction and maintenance within the state
($110/person), and for a miscellaneous collection
of targeted small programs of value to state resi-
dents ($430/person).18 Together, individual state
revenues plus federal aid equaled on average
$4,526/person, a bit more than enough to cover
current spending. In 2006, the average state was
able to run a current-account fiscal surplus equal
to its own revenues plus federal aid ($4,526/per-
son) minus current spending ($4,403/person) of
$123/person, or about 2 percent of current spend-
ing. In the aggregate, deficit financing has been
under control. These state surpluses have been
saved in fiscal stabilization, or rainy day, funds for
future fiscal emergencies. As shown in column 5
of Table 1, by the end of FY 2006, states in the
aggregate had accumulated over $40 billion in
total savings for future fiscal contingencies. 
Against the guidelines for efficient state budg-
eting, there is much to recommend about this
aggregate fiscal performance by U.S. states. In FY
2006, states were spending money on appropriate
state functions, raising most of their money with
Inman
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16 This beggar-thy-neighbor fiscal game is described in Inman (2003)
and then applied by others in country case studies in Rodden,
Eskeland, and Litvack (2003). 
17 See U.S. Census Bureau (2009, Table 439). These figures and those
for federal aid below are from the 2006 Census of Governments and
include all state spending and revenues. 
18 Inman (1988) provides an evaluation of these many programs against
the standards of good public finance. Not surprisingly, federal poli-
tics are an important determinant of the final allocation of federal
dollars. We reach a similar conclusion, noted below, in our evalua-
tion of the recent federal programs designed to help states during
the current fiscal crisis. efficient resident-based taxes, and running small
current-account fiscal surpluses. For the most part,
the federal government provides assistance for
state services with arguably significant interstate
spillovers and does so with appropriate price-
based subsidies. By most measures, states were
fulfilling their assigned role in our federal system
of public finance in FY 2006. 
But those were normal times. Today state gov-
ernments are in deep fiscal distress. The question
now arises: Should the guidelines for good state
financing be relaxed when states face the threat of
deep service cuts or large tax increases? If so, how
does state assistance provided by the ARRA fit
into such revised guidelines? 
UNDERSTANDING TODAY’S 
FISCAL CRISIS
In January 2006, the national unemployment
rate was 4.7 percent. By February 2009, the rate had
more than doubled to 9.5 percent and the U.S.
economy was in the midst of its deepest recession
since the 1930s. The impact of the recession on
state budgets has been significant. By the middle
of FY 2009, 44 states were facing significant fiscal
deficits totaling over $78 billion, or about $260/per-
son. Mid-year deficits as a share of budgeted spend-
ing for FY 2009 equaled 12 percent. Only those
states with significant “severance” taxes on their
state production of oil, gas, and coal were immune
to the deficit pressures. Since most state constitu-
tions preclude making changes to tax rates during
the fiscal year, these looming deficits meant signifi-
cant cuts in state services. These fiscal pressures
have continued into FY 2010. Was the recession
alone to blame, or were there inherent weaknesses
within the fiscal structure of state financing that
only a deep recession could expose? Knowing the
answer to this question will help us evaluate the
policy responses of states, and ultimately the
national government, to this crisis.
Table 1 summarizes the aggregate fiscal perfor  -
mance of the general fund for state governments
since FY 2006.19 In FY 2006, general funds were
Inman
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Table 1
States Under Fiscal Stress: State General Funds (2009$ billions)
State general funds
Fiscal year Revenues Expenditures Balances* Stabilization fund Overall fiscal balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2006 622.0 603.8 18.2 22.4 40.6
2007 671.3 673.2 –1.9 29.1 27.2
2008 669.3 684.7 –15.4 35.0 19.6
2009 638.4 670.0 –31.6 30.4 –1.2
2010† 647.2 652.9 –5.7 28.8 23.1
NOTE: *The state balances reported here are the difference between state revenues in column 1 minus state expenditures in column 2.
This measure differs from the “ending balance” reported in NGA and NASBO (June 2007, June 2008, June 2009, Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3)
because it excludes all revenue “adjustments” and expenditure “adjustments.” Such adjustments typically include the reallocation of rev-
enues and spending obligations from a variety of “off-budget” funds—for example, revenues from tobacco settlement funds, pension obli-
gation bonds, interest payments from bond sinking funds, and transfers into the current budget from state rainy day funds. See NGA and
NASBO (June 2007, June 2008, June 2009, Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes.) Finally, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and South Carolina report their state stabilization funds as part of each fiscal year’s ending
balance. Therefore, to provide an end-of-fiscal-year balance for all states, column 5 is the sum of columns 3 and 4. †The results for FY 2010
are projected numbers as of June 2009. 
SOURCE: NGA and NASBO (June 2007, June 2008, June 2009, Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3). 
19 It should be noted that the levels of funding reported in Table 1 are
limited to state general funds, whereas the level of funding reported
in the “Efficient State Budgeting in Normal Times” section for FY
2006 includes all current-account spending.comfortably in balance. All state revenues—includ-
ing aid from the federal government—exceeded
state spending by the positive balance of $18.2 bil-
lion (Table 1, column 3). This balance can be allo-
cated to a variety of uses in state “capital accounts,”
such as paying down long-term debt, investing in
capital improvements, or adding to stabilization
(rainy day) funds. Some states adopted a variation
of the savings strategy by “rolling over” the surplus
from FY 2006 into the new budget planned for FY
2007.20 The aggregate fiscal position of all state
governments at the end of FY 2006 is the sum of
their surpluses at the end of that year, $18.2 billion,
plus the accumulated savings from prior years now
in their stabilization funds, $22.4 billion (Table 1,
column 4). In FY 2006, the total fiscal balance for
states was $40.6 billion, or $136/person (Table 1,
column 5). 
The recession officially began in December
2007, but states did not begin to feel its full impact
on overall fiscal balances until FY 2008. FY 2007
ended with budgets effectively in balance. There
was a small aggregate deficit of $1.9 billion (Table 1,
column 3) that was more than covered by accumu-
lated prior surpluses of $29.1 billion in state stabi-
lization funds (Table 1, column 4). By the end of
FY 2008, however, the national unemployment rate
had risen to 5.5 percent (the S&P 500 index had
fallen from its peak of 1,549 in October 2007 to
1,280 by June 2008). States were beginning to feel
significant pressure on their budgets. State revenues
fell slightly from FY 2007 (–$2 billion), but state
spending rose by $11.5 billion, particularly state
spending for redistributive services. The net effect
was to increase annual state deficits by $13.5 bil-
lion, from –$1.9 billion in FY 2007 to a more signifi-
cant –$15.4 billion by the end of FY 2008 (Table 1,
column 3). Fortunately, state stabilization funds
of $35 billion were still sufficient to cover this gap
and the overall fiscal balance for all states was
$19.6 billion (Table 1, column 5).
Not so by the end of FY 2009. States had begun
to make significant spending adjustments in antici-
pation of continued falling revenues, but those
adjustments were not enough to prevent an almost
doubling of the deficit of general funds. From FY
2008 to the end of FY 2009, aggregate state revenues
fell by $30.9 billion (Table 1, column 1), but state
spending was reduced by only $14.7 billion (Table 1,
column 2). The net effect was to increase the aggre-
gate deficit, from –$15.4 billion at the end of FY
2008 to –$31.6 billion at the end of FY 2009 (Table 1,
column 3). This deficit fully exhausted the $30.4
billion of accumulated savings in the state stabi-
lization funds (Table 1, column 4), leaving an aggre-
gate deficit of –$1.2 billion.21 Going forward into
FY 2010, states are planning for continued spend-
ing cuts and increases in state revenues. Still, for
FY 2010, these adjustments will leave a planned
general fund deficit of $5.7 billion for all states.22
Table 2 seeks likely correlates in state econ  -
omies, budgeting, and/or politics that might help
explain the large FY 2009 deficits. The dependent
variable is the reported mid-year anticipated deficits
in state budgets as of February 2009, called state
budget gaps. This measure removes the mid-year
adjustments to spending and revenues that states
were able to make before the end of FY 2009 and
therefore provides an estimate of the “structural”
gap created by the fiscal shock of the recession.23
Column 1 of Table 2 reports the partial corre-
lations of attributes of state economies with the size
of each state’s mid-year budget gap.24 The most
important correlate with the state budget gap is
Inman
72 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
20 This is simply an accounting step. Rolled-over surplus is placed in
an interest-bearing account until it is spent in the next fiscal year,
just as the state would do if the funds were placed in a separate sta-
bilization fund. The possible virtue of an explicit stabilization fund
is its transparency to citizens. 
21 See the boxed insert.
22 Note that states anticipate an aggregate level of 2010 state stabilization
funds of $28.8 billion! But, from where? The previous year shows an
overall balance of –$1.2 billion, so it cannot be from prior savings.
And they are estimating revenues will be less than spending for FY
2010. There must be an “outside source” of money that states antici-
pate that is not included in their usual revenue projections. Could
it be from one-time federal assistance through the ARRA of 2009?
The Act plans to allocate $90 to $110 billion to states over FYs 2009
and 2010. It appears states plan to allocate approximately $28.8 bil-
lion of those funds to replenishing their rainy day funds, suggesting
that about $0.30 of every ARRA dollar will be saved for a later fiscal
crisis. 
23 The mid-year adjustments were significant. The reported aggregate
budget gaps as of February 2009 averaged –$78.6 billion, or –$257/per-
son. By the end of FY 2009, the aggregate deficit was –$31.6 billion
(see Table 1, column 5). States were able to trim their mid-year antici-
pated deficits by more than half. 
24 Since the results here are for a one-year cross-sectional regression
of all 50 states, one needs to be cautious about using the word “causal.”
I repeated the analysis in Table 2 omitting California and then Alaska
and Texas and the results are nearly the same. Inman
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Table 2
Determinants of 2009 State Budget Gaps
Average budget gap =  Budget gap  Budget gap  Budget gap  Budget gap  Budget gap  Budget gap 
$257/person [SD = 233] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 3.03 –131.2 190.9 –290.02 –29.06 –183.5
(113) (155.8) (179.5) (202.3) (214.9) (131.8)
State unemployment  55.61  45.09 38.68 48.70 41.51 44.81
February 2009  (14.60)* (14.67)* (18.18)* (15.50)* (15.66)* (14.56)*
[SD = 2.03]
State population  0.005 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010
[SD = 6,672] (0.004) (0.004)* (0.005) (0.005)* (0.005)* (0.004)*
Percent manufacturing  –1,599  –883.3 –1,353.4 –1,126.1 –901.3 –977.1
[SD = 0.065] (422.7)* (500.7)* (532.4)* (504.8)* (496.3)* (475.5)*
State budget 2005  — 0.045 — 0.092 0.039 0.046
[SD = $1,685] (0.019)* (0.044)* (0.029) (0.019)*
Share of budget, Medicaid 2005 — –294.0 ————
(459.9)
Federal aid 2005 — — –0.076 — — —
(0.095)
Cash/securities 2005 — — 11.30 — — —
(22.06)
Senate chairman — — –56.51 — — —
(75.81)
CV, state revenues 2005 — — — –387.4 — —
(1,910)
CV, state expenditures 2005 — — — 213.1 — —
(2,067)
S t a t e  S e n a t e  s e a t s ———— –1.53 —
(2.73)
State House seats ———— –0.132 —
(0.500)
D e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n o r ———— –69.36 —
(54.65)
R2(Adj) 0.35 0.40 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.41
NOTE: *Significant at 5 percent or lower. Standard errors are in parentheses. SD, standard deviation. CV, coefficient of variation. All regres-
sions contain 50 state observations. The variable “Senate chairman” = 1 if a particular state’s senator holds either the chairmanship or is
the ranking minority member of one of the following Senate fiscal committees: Appropriations, Banking and Urban Affairs, Budget,
Commerce and Transportation, Environment and Public Works, or Finance. the state unemployment rate as of February 2009.
The mean unemployment rate is 8 percent, with
a standard deviation (SD) of roughly 2 percent
within the sample. States with an unemployment
rate 1 SD higher than average (10 percent) will have
a budget gap that is $222/person more than a com-
parable state with an unemployment rate 1 SD
lower than average (6 percent): unemployment ×
55.61 = 4.0 × 55.61 = $222.44/person. States with
larger populations also have a larger per capita
deficit gap. Interestingly, it is not the states with
larger manufacturing sectors that have the biggest
budget gaps; the percent of state workers in manu-
facturing had a negative effect on anticipated state
deficits. 
Columns 2 to 4 of Table 2 add state fiscal vari-
ables to the analysis to explore the possible impact
of the structure of state budgeting on the FY 2009
budget gap. All fiscal variables are from FY 2005,
though measured in FY 2009 dollars. The size of
the aggregate state budget in FY 2005 is important,
but the share of that budget allocated to the major
redistribution program—Medicaid—has no signif-
icant effect on the budget gap (Table 2, column 2).
There is no evidence that state expectations of
“outside” funding encouraged a larger budget gap
in FY 2009. Neither federal aid in FY 2005, large
holdings of cash and securities in a rainy day fund
in FY 2005, nor having a Senate budgetary chair-
man from your state is correlated with the “sur-
prise” deficits of FY 2009 (Table 2, column 3). 
Column 4 of Table 2 reports test results for the
general presence of “California Behavior.” Over
the past 10 years, California budgets have relied
Inman
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LOOKING BEHIND THE AGGREGATE DEFICIT
The aggregate deficit for all states reached –$1.2 billion in FY 2009. This aggregate total conceals
a deeper and wider problem, however. In the aggregates are the states with zero or small deficits in
FY 2009, in particular, the resource-rich states of Alaska, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Computation of column 5 of Table 1 for all states excluding Alaska
and Texas reveals that at the end of FY 2009 the other 48 states had a deficit in their general funds
of –$30.6 billion and accumulated savings in their stabilization funds of only $16.9 billion. Thus,
the remaining 48 states had an overall fiscal balance of –$13.7 billion, or about –$50/person.
It is reasonable to ask: How were these states able to cover the remaining $13.7 billion in state
spending? The answer has been to sell state assets, move monies from state funds such as the Tobacco
Settlement Fund that had been earmarked for future spending, and to play the game of allocating May
and June 2009 tax revenues committed to FY 2010 to pay for FY 2009 spending. Interestingly, the
planned level of the state stabilization funds at the end of FY 2010 are still significantly positive, at
$28.8 billion, even though FY 2010 shows an anticipated general funds deficit of –$5.7 billion. How
can that be? The answer is that states did not fully exhaust their available FY 2009 stabilization funds
to cover their FY 2009 deficits. In fact, they used only $1.6 billion for that purpose (FY 2009 Fund –
FY 2010 Fund = $30.4B – $28.8B; Table 1, column 7). This means that most of the FY 2009 deficit had
to be covered by reallocating funds not included in general fund accounting. How this could be done
is detailed in NGA and NASBO (June 2009, Table A-2 notes). 
Finally, California is always worthy of a special look. Its FY 2009 general fund deficit was –$4.7
billion. The state had accumulated $2.3 billion in prior general fund savings—California uses the
rollover approach to account for state savings—for a net end-of-FY 2009 position of –$2.4 billion,
or –$66/person (NGA and NASBO, June 2009, Table A-2). Interesting, too, is that California is the
one state with significant deficits that did not detail in NGA and NASBO (June 2009, Table A-2)
how they planned to fill their revenue gap from nongeneral fund sources.heavily on capital gains taxation for the financing
of state services and have increased state spending
with increases in these tax revenues. Unfortunately,
as revenues have declined, the state legislature has
been unable to agree on comparable cuts in state
spending. The result has been large state deficits
during economic downturns.25 Perhaps the use of
high-variance revenues and the adoption of high-
variance spending programs leads, as it has in
California, to larger budget gaps. Column 4 of
Table 2 tests this proposition, by adding the coef-
ficient of variation of state revenues and spending
for the 20 years prior to FY 2005 to the core regres-
sion. Fortunately, California’s budget behavior does
not generalize; measures of revenue and spending
volatility are uncorrelated with the current budget
gaps across all states.
Column 5 of Table 2 examines whether state
political institutions are correlated with the size
of the 2009 state budget gap. There is no evidence
here that larger state legislative bodies or Democratic
governors correlate with larger state budget gaps
in FY 2009. The political economy literature has
found larger state legislatures do spend more, but
at least for FY 2009 it appears they also committed
to higher taxes.26 Democratic governors may also
spend more, but again in FY 2009, they seemed to
have taxed more too. 
In the end, the most important correlate with
the February 2009 budget gaps is the national reces-
sion, coupled with hopeful forecasting by the states
as to future state revenues and redistributive spend-
ing. The national unemployment rate on June 30,
2008, was 5.5 percent. One year later at the end of
FY 2009, it was 9.5 percent. If 2009 budgets had
been based on projecting forward the 2008 unem-
ployment rate, then the actual 4 percent increase
would have indicated a $180/person to $222/per-
son average budget gap,27 which accounts for almost
all of the variation in observed mid-year deficits
seen in the data. The good news from this analysis
is that the state fiscal crises of 2009 appear not to
be linked to any obvious structural or institutional
failures in state finances. “It’s the economy, stupid.” 
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
As much as states are meant to facilitate effi-
cient resource allocations between local govern-
ments in a well-designed federal system of public
finance, so too is the national government meant
to intervene when there are economic spillovers or
allocative failures between the states. The current
recession is arguably such a moment. The reces-
sion has threatened the ability of states to provide
core services, particularly redistributive services,
to their constituents. Further, as small open econ  -
omies in a large economic union, state governments
may be very limited in their ability to use economic
stimulus strategies to restore state employment and
growth to their pre-recession levels. Free trade and
factor mobility between states mean any state’s
fiscal stimulus will be shared by citizens nationally,
at least in the long run.28 Both for fiscal insurance
for core state services and to stimulate the national
economy, federal government intervention may be
appropriate. 
Congress responded with the passage of the
ARRA on February 17, 2009. The stated purposes
of the legislation are to stimulate the national econ-
omy through $288 billion in tax cuts and $499 bil-
lion in new spending and to protect state and local
public services by sending $223 billion of the new
spending to the states for support of core state ser  -
vices. This $223 billion is to be disbursed over the
three fiscal years beginning in FY 2009 and ending
in FY 2011, thought to be sufficient time for state
economies to recover from the recession. The total
three-year allocation of $761/person nearly equals
three years of the mid-year FY 2009 budget gap
of $257/person. In the aggregate, ARRA funding
appears to be sufficient to protect the level of
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25 Sheffrin (2004) provides a detailed and compelling analysis of
California’s budget “debacle”—his word, not mine—from this 
perspective. 
26 On the positive effects of the size of state legislatures on state spend-
ing, see Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995).
27 That is, 4.0 × 44.81 = $179.24/person (see Table 2, column 6) and
4.0 × 55.61 = $222.44/person (see Table 2, column 1).
28 Gramlich (1987) estimates that at most $0.10 of every dollar of
increased state fiscal stimulus, say in the form of increased state
deficit spending, remains within the state to stimulate its economy.
Even if the state economy does improve, Blanchard and Katz (1992)
provide evidence that workers from other states will eventually move
into the growing state and erode the economic gains for current 
residents. spending states had planned in the spring of 2008
for FY 2009, before the full force of the economic
decline was evident. As fiscal insurance, therefore,
the overall level of federal funding is sufficient to
close state budget gaps. Table 3 shows how the
$223 billion of state assistance is to be allocated
across states. 
How well does ARRA state funding meet its
twin objectives of protecting core state services
and responding to states in economic distress? Its
performance is mixed. If the objective of ARRA
funding is to fully protect state services in each
distressed state, then we should expect a simple
regression of each state’s ARRA assistance against
its budget gap to have an intercept close to 0 and a
slope near 1.0—that is, be a 45-degree line. In fact,
the intercept is $695/person and is statistically
significant and the slope is only 0.25 and statisti-
cally different from both 0 and 1.0 (see Table 3,
column 1). There is fiscal insurance, but it is not
full coverage. 
If ARRA assistance is meant to be a combina-
tion of targeted fiscal insurance and an economic
stimulus for declining states, then we should expect
significant positive coefficients on the levels of
state budget gaps and state unemployment rates
in a total ARRA funding equation (see Table 3,
column 2). We continue to observe partial insurance
coverage but no observable effort to match ARRA
funding to state unemployment rates. With ARRA
funding partitioned into its four main spending
categories—(i) stability aid to protect state jobs
(Table 3, column 3), (ii) Medicaid aid to supple-
ment usual federal Medicaid funding (Table 3,
Inman
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Table 3
Determinants of 2009 ARRA Fiscal Assistance
Total aid Total aid  Stability aid  Medicaid aid Highway aid Other aid Total aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
State average per capita aid  $761 $761 $157 $247 $117 $240 $761
(171) (171) (6) (96) (55) (75) (171)
Constant 695.9 830.1 161.3 43.96 59.20 238.1 415.2 
(34.09)** (93.14)** (4.02)** (45.87) (27.18)* (33.66)** (88.75)**
State unemployment  — –0.719 –0.719 –3.94 0.682 –1.79 –7.72
February 2009 (0.513) (0.513) (5.39) (2.98) (4.31) (8.99)
Budget gap 2009 0.253 0.321 0.002 0.137 0.052 0.045 0.232
(0.098)** (0.107)** (0.004) (0.044)** (0.025)** (0.035) (0.075)**
Medicaid expenses 2005 — — — 0.261 — — 0.392
(0.036)** (0.057)**
Federal highways 2005 ———— 3.43 — 3.95
(0.50)** (1.49)**
State population — — 0.0001 0.0030 –0.0024 –0.0021 –0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0015)** (0.001)** (0.0011)* (0.002)
Senate chairman — — 2.81 –27.10 23.53 32.27 16.69
(1.99) (20.96) (11.10)** (16.69)** (33.86)
Close Obama vote — — –0.506 –11.60 13.96 –6.08 2.12
(2.75) (28.61) (15.22) (23.01) (45.68)
R2(Adj) 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.59 0.67 0.10 0.55
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 10 percent or lower. **Significant at 5 percent or lower. All regressions contain
50 state observations. The variable “Senate chairman” = 1 if a particular state’s senator holds either the chairmanship or is the ranking
minority member of one of the following Senate fiscal committees: Appropriations, Banking and Urban Affairs, Budget, Commerce and
Transportation, Environment and Public Works, or Finance. The variable “Close Obama vote” = 1 if President Obama’s vote share was
within the threshold 0.50 to 0.52 and is 0 otherwise. column 4), (iii) highway aid meant for “shovel-
ready” construction projects (Table 3, column 5),
and (iv) a collection of old and new programs in
“other aid” (Table 3, column 6)—we regress each
aid category on the state unemployment rate, state
budget gap, and category-specific determinants and
find no effort to match ARRA funding to high-
unemployment states and only modest success at
closing state budget gaps. If not full fiscal insurance
or a targeted economic stimulus, what then is ARRA
funding to states seeking to do? 
The evidence in Table 3 suggests two goals: 
(i) stimulate the national economy using states as
agents for spending federal money and (ii) pass an
aggregate economic stimulus package as quickly
as possible.
To get money into the national economy, the
federal government must use existing government
agencies and government programs. States are
effectively federal “agencies” for spending federal
money. Education aid to states (the most important
component of ARRA assistance called “stability
aid”), Medicaid funding, and highway construc-
tion grants are three prominent federal programs.
Together these three spending categories account
for just over two-thirds of all state ARRA funding.
To ensure quick passage of a stimulus program,
the chosen political strategy appears to have been
to (i) give all states some funding, (ii) not open new,
or revisit old, distributional conflicts between the
states, and, finally, (iii) give a bit extra to the states
represented by the chairs and senior members of
the important budgetary committees. Passage of
ARRA took less than one month from its intro-
duction as H.R. 1 on January 26, 2009. The House
approved the final bill by a vote of 246 to 183
(with no Republican support), and the Senate voted
60 to 38 (with 3 Republican “Yea” votes). How were
the funds allocated? First, every state received aid.
The results in Table 3 reveal that stability aid works
as a simple per capita grant, worth on average
$160/person (plus or minus a little bit; see Table
3, column 3). Second, ARRA used existing federal
programs and their distribution formulas to avoid
an unstable redistribution game between all legis-
lators. ARRA selected one program that favored
liberal, large, and high-poverty urban states—
Medicaid aid (see Table 3, column 4)—and another
that favored conservative, small, rural states—
highway aid (see Table 3, column 5). Finally, ARRA
selected many small programs, and created some
new ones in the category “other aid,” for specific
groups of interest to committee members, paying
particularly close attention to states with senators
who run the major budget committees (see Table 3,
column 6).29
There is no evidence that presidential politics
was decisive in the allocation of ARRA funding.
In particular, states that provided Obama with his
presidential election margin—Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, North Carolina, and Ohio—did not receive
additional ARRA support. 
Viewing total ARRA funding as a single federal
policy, it is best described as a three-year formula
grant providing temporary fiscal relief from rising
Medicaid costs and short-term fiscal stress with a
few dollars for highway construction and a lot of
lump-sum aid per capita in the guise of expanded
and new program initiatives (see Table 3, column 7).
The average state will receive $290/person for
Medicaid support (0.392 × average 2005 Medicaid
expense = 0.392 × $741/person) plus $60/person for
relief for fiscal distress (0.232 × average 2009 budget
gap = 0.232 × $257/person) plus $49/person for
highway construction (3.95 × average 2005 high-
way miles = 3.95 × 12.33 miles/person) plus a per
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29 That congressional politics is an important determinant of ARRA
spending should come as no surprise. This has been the “truth” of
federal aid to state and local governments since the 1950s (see Inman,
1988). Here, the importance of “other aid” to the passage of ARRA
is evident from a simple regression of U.S. Senate support by state
(1 if both senators supported the bill, 0 if senator support is split,
and –1 if both senators opposed the bill) on three variables: Obama
(1 if President Obama won the state’s popular vote and 0 otherwise),
Pop (state population), and OthAid (other aid per person allocated
to the state). 
Senate support = –1.22 + 1.15 × Obama – 0.00001 × Pop + 0.004 OthAid R2(Adj) = 0.48
(0.44)  (0.17)                  (0.00001)             (0.002)
All regression coefficients except that on Pop are significant at the
5 percent level or lower. To interpret the results, notice that a non-
Obama state (Obama = 0) receiving no OthAid would be unambigu-
ously opposed to the legislation—that is, Senate support would equal
–1. An Obama state receiving no OthAid would divide its Senate
votes—that is, Senate support would equal 0. Allocating OthAid at
its mean level of $240/person is sufficient, however, to turn Senate
support in an original non-Obama state from no support to a split
vote and in an Obama state from a split vote to full support: 0.004 ×
OthAid = 0.004 × 240 = 0.96. Finally, to test whether OthAid helped
determine Senate support for ARRA, I ran the same regression as
above but replaced OthAid with the state’s allocation of stability aid,
then Medicaid aid, and then highway aid. None of the other aid cate-
gories had a significant effect on Senate support for ARRA. capita grant of $415/person. Together these four
components equal $814/person, accounting for all
funding to be allocated by ARRA. 
CONCLUSION
Today’s deep recession has imposed significant
fiscal hardships on our state governments. States
have adjusted, but not without cuts in government
spending and significant federal assistance through
ARRA. As fiscal insurance for troubled state
budgets, ARRA aid is relatively inefficient. The
program provides a large per capita grant to all
states, troubled or not, while closing at best $0.23
per dollar of each state’s recession-induced budget
shortfall. ARRA’s large component of per capita
assistance is understandable, perhaps, since ARRA
had a second objective of stimulating as quickly
as possible the aggregate economy with a large
infusion of federal monies. To achieve the stimulus
objective it was necessary to use existing federal
programs, and many of the largest (nondefense)
federal programs—school aid, personal transfers,
and construction—are administered by state gov-
ernments. To ensure ARRA would pass quickly,
congressional politics seems to have required that
all states get significant funding. We have muddled
through, but perhaps there is a better way. 
What is needed in times of deep recessions is
protection for state budgets and a quick fiscal stim-
ulus for the macroeconomy. One alternative is a
permanent federal program of fiscal insurance for
state budgets that is triggered by a high unemploy-
ment rate for either an individual state or the nation.
Such a program, however, is likely to create adverse
incentives for at least four important state decisions:
(i) Just as households have reduced precautionary
savings in response to federal income insurance
(welfare and Medicaid), so too might we expect
states to reduce their contributions to their rainy
Inman
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day funds. (ii) With such insurance, states may pre-
fer high-variance tax instruments. Germany has a
variant of fiscal insurance for lower-tier govern-
ments, and there is strong evidence that these gov-
ernments have moved their tax structures toward
more-volatile business taxes and away from more-
stable residential taxes.30 Third, states may lock
in spending programs, either formally by contracts
or informally by political agreements, that are
economically attractive when private incomes are
high but no longer economically justifiable when
private incomes are low. Finally, if tied to state
unemployment rates, such fiscal insurance would
act as a deterrent to the efficient location of eco-
nomic activity. Workers and capital may be dis-
couraged from moving out of declining industries
in declining states, and states may be encouraged
to more aggressively pursue cyclically sensitive
industries. 
Rather than federal fiscal insurance, a better
strategy would be to build on the optimal structure
of state government finances in normal times.
This approach begins by reconfirming the federal
government’s commitment to not bail out state
governments in times of deep recessions. The
“no bailout pledge” places the burden of insuring
against bad economic shocks where it belongs, in
the hands of individual states and their citizens.
Insurance can be provided as it is now, by states
self-insuring through budget-stabilization funds.
An aggregate fiscal stimulus may still be needed
in deep recessions, but the national government
has its own tax and transfer policies available for
this purpose. The evidence is convincing that these
instruments can respond more quickly and are
more powerful tools than government spending as
a means for jump-starting a stalled national econ-
omy.31 This approach leaves state governments to
do what they do well—provide the services their
citizens demand at competitive tax rates. 
30 See Buettner (2007). 
31 See Romer and Romer (forthcoming) and Johnson, Parker, and
Souleles (2006). REFERENCES
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